Archives for August 2019

Jair Bolsonaro and the Destruction of the Amazon

Aerial view of the Amazon Rainforest, near Manaus, the capital of the Brazilian state of Amazonas, Brazil. Photo by Neil Palmer/CIAT cifor.org blog.cifor.org If you use one of our photos, please credit it accordingly and let us know. You can reach us through our Flickr account or at: cifor-mediainfo@cgiar.org and m.edliadi@cgiar.org

Fires raging in the Amazon have captured the world’s attention and put focus on the policies of the Brazilian government.

The true extent of the fires is not yet known–but most sources suggest that the scale of the fires and deforestation underway is much greater than that of previous years. The reason: permissive policies of the Jair Bolsonaro government.

Bolsonaro is a rightwing firebrand who was elected to office in 2018 following major scandals implicating more left wing parties. As my guest today Rebecca Abers explains, once in office Bolsonaro quickly enacted policies that reversed years of progress against forestation of the Amazon.

Rebecca Abers is professor of political science at the University of Brasilia in Brazil. And in this conversation, she describes the bureaucratic maneuvers engineered by Bolsonaro to undermine protections against de-forestation. We also discuss how and why international pressure, including an upcoming major UN Summit on Climate Change, is impacting domestic politics in Brazil and forcing Bolsonaro to more productively combat de-forestation.

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Research Identifies a Link Between Dowry Payments and the Outbreak of Violent Conflict

About 75% of the world’s population live in societies that practice of form of dowry payment. This is also known as brideprice and it is essentially wealth that a potential husband must pay to the family of his would-be wife. But in this way, brideprice acts as a kind of regressive flat tax that younger, and generally poorer men must pay to wealthier, older men.

Hilary Matfess, a PHD candidate at Yale University, undertook a wide study of the impact of fluctuations in brideprice on broader issues related to conflict. She found that there is a positive correlation between changes in brideprice and the outbreak of violent conflict. In other words, when the cost of getting married increases, so too does the probability of armed conflict.

Hilary Matfess published her findings a paper published in the 2017 issues of the academic journal International Security. In it, she and her co-author Valerie Hudson identify how the cost of getting married can lead to the outbreak of violent conflict and war.

Anyone who has ever taken an international relations or security class knows that there are volumes of research on what causes the outbreak of violent conflict. Through case studies, which Matfess discusses in this conversation, the paper demonstrates how fluctuations in brideprices can lead to the outbreak of violent conflict. It is fascinating research with very real-world policy implications.

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What’s up first? Bride prices are often lumped together with dowries. We make a distinction between the two. Bride price is the payment by a male suitor to the family for his intended bride. That is a prerequisite for marriage in a lot of societies where this is practiced. As we were formulating this paper, we started unpacking all of the ways in which this overt transfer of wealth from a young man to an older man, who represents the bride’s family, entrenches patriarchal systems. When you look at it like a Venn Diagram, there is a significant overlap there. So, we looked at how bride price reinforces those patrilineal systems of social control and economic predominance 75% of the world’s population live in societies where this is practiced. It is incredibly common, right? Yes. That factoid came from the Women’s Stats Project, which is a great resource by the way. What are factors that go into setting a bride price or raising it? In general, it is related to the status of the women. I read a paper that suggest the effect of girls education could be variable on bride price. So it depends on local values, systems of socio-economic privilege, and what it comes down to is, regardless of what a young man earns or doesn’t earn, bride price is not dependent on male income. It is dependent on the valuing of women. This, to me, read similar to the Occupy Wall Street Protest. In a number of places where bride price is practiced, so is polygamy. Men will benefit from having multiple wives by extracting their labor, not to go into feminist Marxist analysis. But it is the case that you will get a concentration of bride wealth amongst the elite. So in regard to younger men, there was, in my research, a frustration with the system of not responding to their socio-economic marginalization. So older, wealthier men accumulate wives and younger men have a harder time finding them at a decent price? Right. One thing I wanted to unpack is the centrality of the role of marriage in a number of these societies to your achievement of manhood or womanhood. In the West, and in America certainly, marriage is important, but there has become less of an emphasis on it. However in these societies, to be blocked from marriage isn’t just being blocked from taking a wife, but it is being blocked from a social ritual that validates you as a man and member of society. There is a lot of research that has been conducted over the years that demonstrates that having disaffected young men in particular is a contributor to war and conflict, right? I took a course called “anthropologists for strategists” and we read a piece that stated – adolescence is a social problem. Managing a youth bubble is profoundly difficult. In North East Nigeria, you have a situation where the production of oil has made the country wealthy but leaves that wealth is concentrated in very few hands. In the North, it has led to this collapse of an industrial manufacturing base that was at one point a significant employer. The country is elevating, but there is a large mass of disaffected youth and demographics unable to find work. This means they are unable to earn the economic capital to take a wife and develop the social capital to become a respected member of society. How does this make the leap from a social problem to contributing to violent conflict as your paper demonstrates? The vast majority of my experience is in North East Nigeria. This piece was triggered by interviews I conducted with folks on the ground. One of the things I found striking when interviewing members of the railway neighborhood where Boko Haram was founded, was what Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, was originally like. People kept bringing up how often he would organize marriages for his members. I did not know it was so difficult and central to society there. Bride price in that period had risen precipitously and there were a number of people, the un or underemployed, who were unable to get married. Those were also the people who were drawn to Yusuf because of his condemnation of the system. So, he would often arrange these low cost or free marriages for his members. When we were considering other case studies, I remembered a discussion I went to at the US Institute of Peace where someone mentioned something similar in South Sudan. Many men were joining armed gangs to rustle cattle in order to be able to pay the bride price, which was often paid in cattle. This led to cycles of violence. You demonstrated that bride prices increased substantially following South Sudan’s independence in 2011. The cattle rustling that people found it necessary to do, often was done through gangs with an ethnic affiliations that have later become increasingly apparent as the country slides into civil war between some of the dominant ethnic groups. Right. When I originally presented this idea to some of the harder security folks, people raised an eyebrow. But the comparison I found that makes it click for people is this, following the Arab Spring, the prices of staple crops were rising. People were linking that rise in price, which was disproportionately affecting lower socio-economic classes, to the government’s fault. Quite literally, man cannot live on bread alone. It is not just economic pressure from staple goods that would lead people to be frustrated enough to take action against a system, but also barriers against social rights of passage. So back to the Boko Haram suggestion, you’re suggesting that by doing these mass marriage ceremonies in which bride prices were paid for or reduced was a way to attract young men? Yes, by lowering that barrier to marriage he attracted support and members to his organization. It was one of a number of tools he used to attract members. There was chronic justification that he turned to. In the Quran there was a ceiling for a bride price, but that was regularly disregarded by Christian and Muslim communities in the area. Not only was this a tangible way to support his members, but it also came with a social cache that you held the higher/moral ground because you were interpreting and living by the Quran in a way that this society was not. The flipside of having these lower priced marriage ceremonies is the fact that Boko Haram kidnaps young women. What does your research say around the effect of kidnapping women? I published a book called “Women and the War on Boko Haram”. There are two areas of that I would like to unpack. Boko Haram’s abduction of women and girls is a way to provide wives for their members. One of the men I talked to who escaped from Boko Haram told me that Boko Haram rewards its fighters with wives, so that contributes to your accumulation of social capital. But a number of women joined Boko Haram voluntarily, in part because the group made it easy for them to achieve womanhood because the group practices wife seclusion. It is something I find fascinating. As a young, Western feminist I kick against this idea that wife seclusion is a way for a woman to exercise autonomy. But I was speaking to a number of women who joined voluntarily but were rescued by the military. They would say that life was easier with Boko Haram. They did not have to work on the farm but could do domestic chores. They were also given access to chronic education. Despite the fact that Boko Haram is a brutal insurgency, they expend a significant proportion on education, or indoctrination, for its members through daily preaching and tutoring. Even the women who are abducted are subject to that. It is interesting how Boko Haram has capitalized on the frustration felt by marginalized youth. Basically, it could provide young men or women with significant social capital to live the life that was previously denied to them. You found a correlation between rising bride prices to be a contributing factor to violent conflict. Can you discuss what Saudi Arabia is doing to control the bride price market? Sure, that example was really interesting. When you unpack the export of terrorism from Saudi Arabia, there is a lot of grievance related to young men. Demographically, it has a lot of similar characteristics to the societies we say are at risk of violence because of bride price dynamics. But their government has sort of recognized the instability within the marriage markets and has worked with communities to establish voluntary caps on bride price. They perform large group ceremonies which significantly reduce that barrier to access that is such a catalyst for violence in Nigeria and South Sudan. What is the going rate for getting married? I actually do not know it at present and it is fluctuating. What was interesting is that amongst a lot of the displaced communities, bride price is falling precipitously. In some areas that are in the processes of recovering from Boko Haram, religious leaders were instituting a cap on the bride price that made it more feasible but not offensive. In general, however, the prices would certainly be more than someone makes in a year. In South Sudan you gave the example of how after independence in 2011, the bride prices shot up from 40 head of cattle to 100. Right, there was a report that found that at the rate cattle was selling, weddings could cost between 10,000 and 60,000 USD. And as a reminder, that is a transition of wealth from a young, unemployed man to an older, established man. So, it is a regressive flat tax. It does not take into account the fluctuation in male earnings, but it is an intergenerational transfer of wealth that favors those who have already accumulated significant amounts of social and economic capital. I would love to get your thoughts on the significance of getting this published in International Security. Dr. Hudson, my co-author, has written elegantly and powerfully on how the best predictor of whether a state will experience intra or inter-state conflict is the status of women within its borders. Bride price has a strong, gendered dynamic to it. So, we need to understand gender relations and the status of women. The ways in which we have been gathering intelligence in this region has not taken into account the different standards as they relate to women’s dress or to societal expectations. I think in North Eastern Nigeria and elsewhere, the western security establishment is overlooking over a lot of gendered, early warning indicators. One of the conclusions of your report, however, is not to educate more women but that governments should do what they can to put caps on bride prices to prevent conflict. There is a strong contingency within feminist advocacy to end bride price in general as a practice. I have seen compelling evidence coming out of Uganda about that. Girls education is a worthy aspiration. What we are advocating here is to be pragmatic and accept that these are market dynamics that will not disappear overnight. So if countries are interested in stability, then they need to recognize that this is a destabilizing market dynamic and it is in their power to intervene.

How We Can Feed the World Without Destroying the Planet

The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the IPCC, released a report in August demonstrating the harmful relationship between climate change and how we humans are using land for food and agriculture.

The warnings are dire. Agriculture and deforestation account for nearly a quarter of all human made greenhouse gas emissions — and big changes in how we produce and consume food need to take place if we are to curb the worst effects of climate change. At the same time, the world population is increasing and poverty is declining, meaning food consumption patterns, particularly around meat, are changing.

Big changes in how we produce and consume food need to take place if we are to curb the worst effects of climate change.

On the line with me to discuss how we can feed the world without destroying the planet is Timothy Searchinger. He’ s a research scholar at Princeton University and fellow with the World Resources Institute. He was recently the lead author on a report by WRI Creating a Sustainable Food Future: A Menu of Solutions to Feed Nearly 10 Billion People by 2050.
We kick off discussing the IPCC report and the significance of its findings before having a solutions- focused conversation about policies that can be enacted to help better balance our relationship between food and how humans use the finite resource of land.

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War Crimes and Ethnic Cleansing Were Committed Against the Rohingya of Myanmar. They Deserve Justice. But How?

In August 2017, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar fled across the border to Bangladesh. The Rohingya are a minority population that have long faced discrimination by the Buddhist Burmese majority. In the summer of 2017, things got very bad, very quickly.

A Rohingya militant group attacked some police outposts in Myanmar. The government and military responded by attacking Rohingya towns and villages, unleashing massive violence against a civilian population. This drove over 600,000 Rohingya to refugee camps in a region of Bangladesh known as Cox’s Bazar.

Some 700,000 Rohingya refugees remain there, to this day.

The violence that drove these people from their home was certainly a crime against humanity — a UN official called it “a text book example of an ethnic cleansing.”  And maybe even a genocide.

That of course demands the question: who will pay for these crimes. What does accountability look like in a situation like this. And can perpetrators of these crimes even be brought to justice in the first place? On the line with me to discuss these questions in the context of the current plight of the Rohingya refugees is Param-Preet Singh, Associate Director, International Justice Program of Human Rights Watch.

We kick off discussing the events of August 2017 before having a longer conversation about possible avenues for justice for these crimes.

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This episode pairs well with my conversation last week with former Obama administration official Ben Rhodes, who discusses the fall from grace of Aung San Suu Kyi, the nobel peace prize winner who was the de-facto head of state of Myanmar while these crimes against humanity occurred–and who remained a notably silent bystander to ethnic cleansing. 

Remembering the Yazidi Genocide, Five Years On

In the summer of 2014, ISIS forces swept through parts of Iraq that were home to the Yazidi people. This is an ethnic minority that has lived in northwestern Iraq for centuries — and suddenly they were under attack.  What transpired was a genocide. Men and boys were murdered for being Yazidi; women and girls were kidnapped and taken as sex slaves for ISIS fighters.

At the time, Emma Beals was reporting from Erbil, a city in the Kurdish region of Iraq near to where these atrocities were taking place. She was reeling from the news that a fellow journalist, James Foley, had been brutally murdered when she received a call from a human rights organization asking her to investigate rumors of a massacre in the Yazidi town of Kocho.

Emma Beals describes whats next in a series of powerful essays, titled Kocho’s Living Ghosts. There were 19 surviving men from the town’s original population of 1,888. In our conversation Emma Beals recounts the massacre through the testimony of the survivors she interviewed.

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What’s up first?

So when I first heard about the massacre, I was already in Iraq. I was living on the Turkish border at the time. As ISIS had moved towards Sinjar at the beginning of August, I was with VICE journalists and we were covering the breaking news. So we had spent two weeks at that point in Northern Iraq covering those scenes of flows of people through the dessert as they came from Sinjar Mountain, through Syria, into Iraq. We were covering the U.S. airstrikes and then that assignment came to an end and it was two days after the murder of journalist, James Foley. So the end of that assignment was very difficult, everyone in the press core was upset, and I was personally affected. It was a really hard time and I did not know what to do with myself or where to go. I was alone in this hotel room when the phone rang. It was a human rights NGO calling about a particular massacre, among all of the Yazidi massacres, in Kocho. When ISIS comes into a town, a lot of people just flee into the mountains and those that do not are killed. But in Kocho, they were surrounded. This NGO asked me to go as a temp until they could get someone to the region. The survivors were starting to find their way to Duhok and the NGO wanted me to debrief them before the people were overly influenced or had a chance to compare their stories, so their statements could be used in court later on.

We are speaking around the five year anniversary of this massacre. Can you describe what led up to this assault on Sinjar?

It is kind of a “how long is a piece of string” question. The conflict in Syria had been going on for a number of years and during that what was known as ISI became ISIS, and in 2014 they had sort of increased their reach across the border back into Iraq. They shocked the world by taking Mosul City in Iraq in the space of a weekend. It was like they came out of nowhere but their history was extensive. In terms of their impact in Iraq and the world’s understanding of ISIS, hundreds of thousands of people were displaced from the city and countryside. Nobody expected they had that kind of military power or that the Iraqi forces did not have enough to resist them. They had taken this large chunk of territory, a lot of which was not strategically valuable. Fast forward a couple of months to August, ISIS swept across the Yazidi territory and into the Mosul dam. They started to push on some of the other adjacent towns. It had been building for a couple months but it took everyone by surprise with its intensity.

This was a genocide made up of a number of massacres and individual atrocities. Can you describe what unfolded and how that massacre transpired?

So, in Kocho ISIS arrived in the morning of August 3rd. They surrounded the town and engaged in some kind of conversation with the chief. He tried to implore them to let the people go to the Sinjar Mountain. He called on the village leaders who he thought might have some influence with the ISIS fighters. There were about 1200 people in Kocho on this day. The fighters told them to give up their weapons, stay in their houses, raise their white flags, and then they besieged the town. That went on for 12 days until August 15th. Abu Hamza, a local ISIS Emir, announced that everyone had to gather in the school. He separated everyone in the school by women, men, and children. He asked them one final time if they would convert to Islam and they said no. Then a Kurdish speaking ISIS fighter came in and this made the people a little more trusting since he spoke their language. But, the ISIS fighters took all of their valuables – earrings, gold, mobile phones. Then they started with the men and loaded them onto trucks, promising they would see the women and children again. The trucks went to the edge of the village. The ISIS fighters ordered the men onto their knees and shot all of them. Then they would go off, take another load of men, take them to another location, and repeat this. Those that were injured and couldn’t move were buried alive. Some of them crawled out from piles of their loved ones and managed to escape.

Do we know how many people were killed that way?

They have exhumed around 160 bodies, but that is not a definitive number.

You told two stories of Kichi Amo and Saed Murad. How did Kichi Amo survive this ordeal?

Rather miraculously, he was not injured at all. He was shot alongside his family and managed to crawl out from under the bodies. He ran off and waited until the sun went down. Saed was hit several times and his cousins were killed next to him. He stayed very still until the fighters had gone away. Then he crawled out, in his words, “like a snake”. He found an abandoned farmhouse where he met up with a guy named Ali. They told me the story of how they escaped from there. They waited until the sun went down, watched ISIS bury the men, and watched them take the women and children in cars as hostages. Then they set off to walk to Sinjar. Saed had six bullet wounds and Ali had been shot as well. They went off and found a village where they knew someone. They knocked on his door in the middle of the night asking for help. The man had been threatened against helping any of the Yazidis, but he got them medical help and then made them leave. They tried to leave the village again and a few more individuals tried to help. Some of the villagers were very kind. They tried to sell their crops in order to pay a smuggler to get them all the way to the mountain. Eventually, they cobbled their way there in six days. They were brought to the hospitals in Duhok which is where I met them.

And Saed is the brother of Nadia Murad, the Nobel Peace Laureate?

Right, so they are an exceptional family. Nadia has done this incredible advocacy work and Saed joined the militias that helped to fight ISIS out of the town and was given awards for his bravery in combat.

Can you further describe your visit to Kocho?

Kocho was held by ISIS for three years. In 2017, they were beaten out. I had been wanting to go back, because I had my own trauma from that summer that got mixed up with what happened in Kocho.

Your referring to journalists that you cared for who were murdered by ISIS?

That’s right. They were murdered that summer of 2014. I had so much empathy for the survivors I met during that time. I went back to Iraq in the summer of 2017 and I tracked down Kichi, Saed, and Ali. We talked about everything and how they were moving on. I realized in the course of talking to them that I could not ask them to come to the town with me. Nobody was living there and it was still insecure. There were varied opinions whether it was somewhere people wanted to return. So, I went by myself. The school is now a memorial, but at the time it still had debris on the floor. You could still feel the enormity of what happened in that space. There was a sense of everyone who had been lost. I went to the mass graves and at that time they had not started exhuming them. Everything was exactly as it was, so you could identify the bullet casings next to the mounds of dirt where the bodies were buried. It really pictured the banality of evil.

You don’t have to answer this, but you went seeking some catharsis and healing, did you find that?

It was more about compulsion than a sense of healing. I kind of did. The graves of my friends were never found, but that gave me a sense of what they might be like. It helped me situate some of the other atrocities as well that I could not visit. It was helpful to talk to the survivors. We had some philosophical discussions about forgiveness and healing.

What is Kichi Amo up to now?

Him and his cousin were rescuing some of the women from Kocho. He produced lists of the women they had freed. His own family was saved and they were in Germany getting assistance.

Finally, the crimes you described cry out for justice. Is there any sense of a local judicial process or justice initiative?

Justice comes in many forms. There are broader conversations that are being helped by the likes of Nadia Marad. You have the graves being exhumed through a proper process up to international standards, which helps with accountability. It is complicated with Iraqi law because in Iraq, those associated with ISIS are being tried just for being a member. So, those trials are not saying, this man was involved in this massacre, which is how you would get that real sense of healing. There is a crisis of psychological assistance. While there are organisations doing wonderful work, there isn’t enough help. For some folks, like Kitchi told me he never wants to go back to Kocho, so he needs somewhere he can go. Others want to go back, but there are political issues. So there is a more practical form of justice, which is to provide the conditions for survivors live a dignified life. But, this is moving quite slowly and prohibiting people from healing.

Shownotes by Lydia DeFelice

How Aung San Suu Kyi Went from a Human Rights Icon to a Bystander to Genocide

When Ben Rhodes first met Aung San Suu Kyi she exuded the all traits that made her such an international icon for human rights and democracy. The year was 2012, and Ben Rhodes, who was the deputy national security advisor, was accompanying Barack Obama in an historic visit to Myanmar. As he puts it, this meeting was the high water mark for her moral authority. There was a hopefulness, surrounding her, he says.

Now seven years later, she has been stripped of many international accolades, honors and prizes.  At issue is the fact that as the most powerful civilian leader in Myanmar she refused to intervene against, or even publicly condemn, a genocide committed by the government against a religious and ethnic minority.  Some 700,000 ethnic Rohingya have fled Myanmar amid what a UN official has called a textbook example of ethnic cleansing. All the the while, Aung San Suu Kyi was silent. 

So what happened to Aung San Suu Kyi? How did a Nobel Peace Prize winner who spent decades under house arrest in an elegant pursuit of democracy and justice in Myanmar fall so from grace? And was the international community, including the Obama administration, wrong about her all along? 

Ben Rhodes grapples with these questions and more in a new piece in The Atlantic that combines some of his own self-reflection with fresh reporting, which he discusses on the podcast.

We kick off setting the historic context for Aung San Suu Kyi’s rise to prominence and the circumstances of her persecution and house arrest before having a longer conversation about the causes and implications of her becoming a bystander to genocide. 

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Note that next week on the podcast, I’ll be doing whole episode more directly focusing on the Rohingya genocide, including ongoing human rights abuses and the current humanitarian challenges facing hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. So, stay tuned to that–it will compliment this conversation with Ben Rhodes.

 What’s up first?

Aung San Suu Kyi has really been the defining figure of Burmese politics over the last several decades. She is the daughter of Aung San, the “George Washington” of Burma. He was assassinated right before independence when she was only two years old. She ended up growing up in India where her mother was an ambassador. She moved to the UK, married a British citizen, and entered politics by accident. In 1988, her mother had a stroke and Aung San Suu Kyi returned to Burma to be with her. At that exact moment, student protests were rocking the country against a brutal, reclusive military government. Aung San Suu Kyi addressed half a million people in the then capital. She became the leader of the opposition and won the next election overwhelmingly. However, the junta put her in prison, largely under house arrest. She became a Mandela like figure. She was even awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. For the next two decades she was under house arrest and after she was released, she re-entered politics.

During her time under house arrest, she displayed profound personal courage.

When she was campaigning in 1989, a firing squad of soldiers faced her and told her to turn around. She refused and kept walking towards them. They were given the order to shoot, but they could not kill the daughter of their national hero. Under house arrest, she was in extreme isolation. During one of her releases, a mob of men were released around her vehicle and there was a riot where dozens of people were killed, but she somehow escaped. She was subjected to a lot of trauma and had to demonstrate enormous courage. For instance, her husband died while she was under house arrest. The military said she could go back to the UK to be with him, but obviously they would not let her back into the country, so she chose to stay. She wrote passionately about human rights in series of essays that were embraced by the likes of Desmond Tutu. She earned her reputation as a human rights icon.

Going back to those early years of the Obama administration, what did diplomacy towards Myanmar look like?

Obama campaigned on the return to diplomacy. When he said that line, “we will extend a hand if you unclench your fist,” one of the countries in mind was Burma. We had an envoy, Derek Mitchell, and he began to explore whether they could open up and change their governance. We saw some initial signs that they were prepared to go in a different direction. Then, in 2011, a new president from the military started to allow for more media freedom, released political prisoners, allowed exiled Burmese individuals to return, and freed Aung San Suu Kyi. The Obama administration reciprocated, appointing Derek Mitchell as ambassador and welcomed them in from the cold.

When was the first time you met Aung San Suu Kyi?

It was in 2012. Barack Obama travelled to Burma shortly after his re-election. It was extraordinary, because we landed in the airport and it was really a backwards infrastructure. We went to Aung San Suu Kyi’s house, which was powerful. There was a real sense of hopefulness. She had re-entered parliament and was discussing learning the intricacies of parliamentary maneuvers and how to make the democracy that she had been writing about real through institutional mechanisms. After we left this meeting, I was in the car with Obama and he said, “I used to be the face on the poster and your image always ends up fading.” When you’re in politics it is hard to maintain your status as an icon. Suu Kyi said she was not an icon but a politician, which kind of foreshadows some of the things that have happened.

It was in 2012 that she came to the U.S., right?

Yes, it was kind of a victory lap. She travelled around the country and thanked different constituencies that had supported her. Obama welcomed her to the White House and it was a very hopeful moment.

I remember her from a press conference at the United Nations. She refused to say the word “Rohingya”. That signaled to me that there could be something dark lurking under this icon. What was the moment you realized that the Rohingya issue might be something in which her moral authority would be undermined?

In 2012 the Rohingya issue was prominent. In Burma, both Muslims and people of South Asian descent are discriminated against. There have been previous incidents in Burmese history where the Rohingya were targeted and driven across the border to Bangladesh. They were a persecuted minority. In 2012, there was an outbreak of violencedue to an alleged rape of a Buddhist woman by a Rohingya Muslim. When Obama sat down with her, he said we needed to work to resolve this issue and that she needed to use her moral authority. In private, she would say the word Rohingya and acknowledge the difficulties they faced. However, she would indicate that this was a very complicated issue and that the vast majority of Burmese were prejudiced against Rohingya. If she made that central to her agenda, the military would use that against her. Her plan was to democratize the country and put herself more in power to where she could help with such issues. While there was a warning sign that she did not want to spend her political capital on this issue, she did privately say the right things. So how do we try to work on the democratization of Burma while also trying to help this persecuted minority that does not have any popular support?

It seems that by 2015 in her landslide victory with the NLD party, the central tension was between her desire to act like a politician and help the persecuted Rohingya minority.

When she was elected, I would raise these issues with her. She would say she was trying to democratize the country and reform the constitution. There are constitutional amendments that prevent her from being President. It is a strange amendment that says if you have foreign born children, you can’t be president, clearly targeting her. Her argument was always that she had to finish the job of reforming the constitution before she could do anything about the Rohingya population. Our argument was that she needed to speak out on this and use her moral authority as the most popular politician in the country. She was always reluctant to do so. Her answer was, after she became State Counsellor in 2016, to appoint Kofi Annan to chair a commission that would look into this issue and make recommendations.  

But then, the Annan Commission said the Rohingya should be granted full citizenship rights and she did not implement that recommendation.

Well, two things happened. In October, 2016 violence broke out again and this time a new group, the Rohingya Salvation Army, attacked Burmese police outposts and killed several people. The response was way disproportionate displacing tens of thousands of people. This problem had begun to boil over. In the summer of 2017, the Annan Commission issued its recommendations that the Rohingya population needed to be granted citizenship to be protected. Days later, there was another attack from this Rohingya insurgent group that killed more Burmese police. This time it felt like the military had a plan to ethnically cleanse the Rohingya. 700,000 Rohingya were driven into Bangladesh. While this was happening, Suu Kyi said nothing or denied it, which is what drew international condemnation on her.

What is going through your mind at this point?

With her, I just felt profound disappointment. She basically chose her own power over fighting for human rights. She famously wrote that “the ultimate freedom is freedom from fear” and that “people who don’t have power fear the scorns of power, and those with power are corrupted and don’t want to give it up.” She transformed into what she argued against, a politician who would not take a moral stand if it compromised their politics.

Is it possible that she is a racist?

She is not in charge of these operations, so to be fair to her she cannot order or terminate these operations. If she could, I do not think she would perpetrate an ethnic cleansing. She is prejudiced enough to where she sees the Rohingya as less Burmese than other people in Burma. The majority ethnic group is Burman and the majority religious group is Buddhism. She is Burman and Buddhist. I think she does harbor some of the prejudice you see throughout the country. She is a traumatized individual herself. It is hard for us to know what 20 years of extreme isolation, house arrest, and threats do to compromise your ability to empathize with people who are different.

I went back and talked to people in Burma about what had happened. One of the things that has occurred is an explosion of social media. A country that had almost zero internet penetration went to 95% penetration in a few years. The entire internet experience is through Facebook. You see an explosion of hate speech against Rohingya. The tragedy of Burma is something that is unique to its country, but it also shares this global trend of nationalism, religious identity, and social media presence supercharging that.

Are there any broader foreign policy lessons you could draw from this?

There are trends that are really important for people to see. One is social media and this rise in nationalism. The Burmese National Security Advisor told me quite candidly that this would be easier in the 1990’s when democracy was spreading. Now, Burma is in a neighborhood where that is not a trend. The role of China here is critically important. They do not care about human rights and the Burmese know they can turn to the Chinese. I do think what this means is that the international community needs more tools to deal with crises like these. Accountability through the International Criminal Court is important. Further, spotlighting instances like this and putting Burma on the diplomatic offensive at the UN are tools that could moderate their behavior.

I also discuss the debate over sanctions. To be fair, the Obama administration got a lot of critique for lifting sanctions on Burma. I have come to think that the bad actors in the military are the best sanctions evaders as it is. China is a hedge against sanctions because countries can turn to China if the U.S. cuts them off. But you have to debate the role for sanctions, and there is a role that is targeted at bad actors. I think mobilizing international diplomatic pressure is really all we have to fight back against these trends. One lesson is that we can’t put all of our eggs in one basket. I wanted to draw out through this story how essentially, it is tempting to view other countries through the prism of a single icon, but we have to see the whole picture.  

Shownotes by Lydia DeFelice

Drought in the Horn of Africa is Threatening 15 Million People

The Horn of Africa region, which includes parts of Somalia, Kenya,  Ethiopia, is experiencing a severe drought. This region has been particularly vulnerable to droughts in recent years–but the situation this summer has become increasingly dire and is raising the prospect of a widespread humanitarian emergency.

A little background: In the summer of 2011, there was a similar drought in the region. But warnings about the humanitarian consequences of this drought went largely unheeded until the drought lead to a famine — the first of the 21st century. Over the subsequent weeks and months over 260,000 people died, making this famine one of the worst mass atrocities of this decade.

That was 2011. In 2017, there was another drought. But this time, the international community and governments in the region responded with urgency. They were able to provide humanitarian assistance and other aid and interventions that prevented the tragedy of 2011 from being repeated.

This brings us So that is all some recent historic background to an email that landed in my inbox from Oxfam, which compared data around the humanitarian response in 2011 to the response to the current ongoing drought, which shows that compared to 2011, the humanitarian needs are greater and the international response is far less robust. This of course suggests that unless something changes, the current drought could lead to another famine.

On the line with me to discuss the current humanitarian situation in the Horn of Africa is Dustin Barter, the regional drought policy and advocacy lead, Oxfam. He authored a report comparing the impact of the 2011, 2017 and current drought and the international humanitarian response.

If you have 20 minutes and want to learn why the international community ought to be paying attention to an incipient humanitarian emergency in the Horn of Africa, have a listen

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What’s up first?

Currently, we are experiencing a severe drought in the Horn. It is affecting more than 15.3 million people in need of humanitarian assistance. The drought comes very quickly after the 2017 drought that devastated a lot of the area as well. We see in the first 6 months of 2019 there has been a steep rise in the quantity of people in need of humanitarian assistance. We have tried to raise the profile of this crisis, but because it comes so soon after 2017 there is a lack of mobilization. It is hard to gain traction globally. Yet, in the first six months of this year the humanitarian numbers have increased dramatically and funding has been stifled. Yet, we learned from responses in 2011, there was a massive drought and the response was slow. It resulted in famine with over 260,000 people dying in Somalia. In 2017, a drought struck and with 2011 in mind, the response was well funded and timely and averted the worst impacts. So we are now in 2019, are we headed towards a 2011 disaster or will we respond positively like we did in 2017?

How is this drought affecting the livelihoods of the impacted 15.3 million people?

It is devastating across the three countries. You can grow things out of mud but you can’t grow anything out of dust. Nobody has effectively recovered from 2017 yet. The impact is severe, people do not have livestock. I spoke with a woman from Somaliland and she discussed the recent rains and the response of the international community. She said yes there has been rain, but who wants to eat grass? Nobody has livestock, so there are no benefits from that rain. People are scrambling to get drinkable water and water to save their livestock. Moreover, people have to travel to urban centers so there is a lot of displacement. This is also a security risk. Drought is a driver of risk in these contexts because people are forced to migrate across risky areas, and areas they aren’t familiar with. Men often travel off to find some form of income, which places a heavy burden on women and children left behind. Food prices go up because agricultural production has been decimated. So if you have lost your livestock, you are also facing higher costs for your basic needs.

Is there a direct correlation between drought and food prices?

Often times, yes. As soon as cereals and other food production diminishes, the demand is still there, so the prices increase quickly. There is a recent article looking at 45 million people in need of humanitarian assistance across 14 eastern and southern African nations. The Horn of Africa is part of this larger climate crisis.

An important context here is the 2011 drought that led to famine. It was one of the worst mass atrocity events of the 21st century. What led to that event? Are you seeing any parallels?

It was catastrophic. There was a severe failure of international humanitarian architecture. What unfolded is in 2011 there were early warnings, but it was only around June when people said it was bad. In early July people said it was really bad, and by the end of July famine was declared. Drought we see as a slow onset disaster, but the situation turned quickly because of the severe vulnerability of communities.

Famine, in the context of these conversations, does not just mean people lack food. It is actually a threshold that the UN and others use to determine why people are dying because of lack of food. Child mortality and malnutrition have to reach certain levels. Can you explain that threshold?

Right, so when you actually get to the point of famine being declared there are already mass deaths. There are a lot of technical processes and it is usually up to the UN to decide when famine has hit. As we saw in 2011, famine was declared quickly after alarms were raised and the result was 260,000 deaths. Even in the 21st century, that number is an absolute catastrophe. The funding situation is less than 2011 but the humanitarian need is 50% more. We don’t want to use the word famine now, because we don’t want to cry wolf, but the situation looks bleak.

Is one key difference that in 2011 you had the Al-Shabab insurgency that was raging?

The security situation has vastly improved since 2011. But, you still face extreme insecurity in certain parts of Somalia. There are still a lot of attacks and restrictions and challenges for humanitarian aid. To deliver the assistance to the amount of people is restrained, so while security has improved, if you don’t have the resources to deliver aid, you will really struggle.

Can you discuss how that 2017 response prevented the worst case scenario?

So, 2017 was marked by mass mobilization of political will and financial resources. The UN, EU, and U.S. were active, and as were the governments of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia. The African Union and IGAD were also active. Additionally, the private sector contributed funding. Early intervention is far more economical, practical, and effective in saving lives. It is more expensive to act later.

Right now, the needs are greater and the funds are less robust. Can you discuss that funding gap?

In 2011 there were 9.8 million people in need during June/July. Now it is 15.3 million. The funding plan in 2011 was 46.5% funded. Now the response plans are 35.4% funded. That is a 1.5 billion dollar funding gap. If you have a gap that large, how many lives can you save if you don’t have the resources to do so? A lot of humanitarian responders do not want to be seen as continually asking for money, but what we also need to recognize compared to 2011, the Kenyan government has taken a much more proactive role in delivering humanitarian assistance. Currently, the Ethiopian government is funding nearly 50% of the humanitarian response plan. National governments have definitely stepped up. But, the international community needs to recognize that while these governments have done a lot, they are resource constrained and we need to step up our game.

This has to be situated in the border/climate crisis context. This is not just a drought but the new reality of the climate crisis. It is a bit rich of us to say we are tired of funding humanitarian responses, when we have benefited so economically from the vast emissions we have contributed. The Horn of Africa is the canary in the coal mine of the climate crisis impacts as much as sinking islands in the Pacific. This is not just a matter of immediate humanitarian response, which is critical, but looking at broader climate change adaptation and long term resilience. We need more coherent and longer term action plans.

In the short term, if that funding gap is not closed, what are the chances a famine befalls this region again?

There are predictions for the coming months that the situation will deteriorate. People, including Oxfam and myself, are reluctant to be seen as “crying wolf” by saying famine is likely. But, if you look at the numbers and need, with or without famine, people are extremely vulnerable. We know early response is best and most cost effective.

On the long term climate resilience point, what is an example of a climate resilience project that wealthier countries could invest in to reduce the likelihood that these droughts turn into food security crises?

One example is Somalia’s national debt which stands at 4.6 billion, which is comparatively nothing if you look at the U.S. Yet, they are restricted from accessing international financing, whether that be grants or loans. The international community pushes the Somali government to do more, but how can they do anything when they are totally restricted from accessing international finance? If we want to talk about systemic justice and the ability to build resilience in Somalia, then we need to take this issue of debt relief seriously. Kenya has the Hunger Safety Net Program. It is ambitious and promising, but it needs to be better funded and reaching the most vulnerable more consistently. We need to look at the bigger picture.

In the coming weeks/months, what indicators will you be looking towards to see whether or not the situation will stabilize or deteriorate?

There are multiple early warning systems that have already been triggered in various ways. The severity of the impacts is both predictable and preventable. Nobody wants to look back in 2020 and say we have failed again. In the next few months we should look at rainfall patterns, pasture coverage, and other mechanisms to measure the situation. It is unpredictable, though. In 2011, the situation from June to July changed dramatically and all of the sudden there was famine. It is better to monitor everything, but don’t be afraid to act early and adopt a “no regrets policy”.

Shownotes by Lydia DeFelice

Ethiopia is in the Midst of a Rapid Democratic Renewal. Can It Succeed?

Ethiopia’s political scene is changing. Since taking office in April 2018, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has accelerated a process of political opening, including a greater freedom of press, the release of political prisoners, a detente with Eritrea, and other meaningful reforms.

But Ethiopia’s transition to a liberal, open and multi-party democracy has faced some significant challenges in recent weeks. On June 22, an a general tried to orchestrate a coup attempt, which resulted in two high profile assassinations. That coup attempt, which failed, came on the heels of inter-communal clashes that forced nearly 3 million people from their homes.

Now, the democratic renewal underway in Ethiopia is very much being challenged.

On the line to help explain why Ethiopian politics is at such a pivotal moment right now is William Davidson, senior Ethiopia analyst with the International Crisis Group. He offers listeners some helpful context and background for understanding the current situation, including what is driving change and the counter-reactions to the process of democratic renewal.

If you have 25 minutes and want to learn why Ethiopian politics is at such a crucial crossroads right now, have a listen.

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